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DUELLING PROSPECTING RIGHTS: A NON-CUSTODIAL SECOND?
Meepo v Kotze 2008 1 SA 104 (NC)
“The seconds of both parties shall stand together; having taken their ground, they first command, 
‘Make ready,’ which is followed by the word ‘Fire’.”*
1 Introduction
This decision of the Northern Cape division dealt with competing “old order pros-
pecting rights” and prospecting rights in terms of the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA). The decision represents an im-
portant contribution to the resolution of tensions between the old mineral law order 
and the new regime of Act 28 of 2002. This discussion begins by providing some 
* Rule 53 of the French Duelling Code as reproduced from Millingen The History of Duelling (1841) 
http://duellingpistols.com/Frenchcode.htm (21-08-2007). The rules of the Duelling Code had been 
sanctioned by twenty-five general officers, eleven peers of France, fifty officers of rank and the 
minister of war.
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background information to contextualise the problem that arose in the Meepo case. 
This is followed by a synopsis of the facts of the case. The analysis of the decision 
by Lacock J and Olivier J is preceded by a review of general statements initially 
made by the court regarding provisions of Act 28 of 2002 and the constitution. We 
conclude with a few comments on the impact of the decision for the development of 
the new mineral and petroleum law.
2 Background
Act 28 of 2002, which came in effect on 1 May 2004, provides a list of very broad 
objectives in section 2, namely to:
(a)  recognise the internationally accepted right of the state to exercise sovereignty 
over all the mineral and petroleum resources within the Republic;
(b)  give effect to the principle of the state’s custodianship of the nation’s mineral 
and petroleum resources;
(c) promote equitable access to the nation’s mineral and petroleum resources to 
all the people of South Africa;
(d)  expand opportunities for historically disadvantaged persons, including 
women, substantially and meaningfully to enable them to enter the mineral 
and petroleum industries and to benefit from the exploitation of the nation’s 
mineral and petroleum resources;
(e)  promote economic growth and mineral and petroleum resources development 
in the Republic;
(f)  promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of all 
South Africans;
(g)  provide for security of tenure in respect of prospecting, exploration, mining 
and production operations;
(h)  give effect to section 24 of the constitution by ensuring that the nation’s min-
eral and petroleum resources are developed in an orderly and ecologically 
sustainable manner while promoting justifiable social and economic develop-
ment; and
(i)  ensure that holders of mining and production rights contribute towards the 
socio-economic development of the areas in which they are operating.
Act 28 of 2002 recognises “old order prospecting rights” in its transitional arrange-
ments in schedule II of the act and makes provision for the conversion of “old order 
prospecting rights” into (new) prospecting rights (item 6 of schedule II). Before an 
“old order prospecting right” could have been exercised in terms of the now repealed 
Minerals Act 50 of 1991, a prospecting permit had to be obtained in terms of sec-
tion 6 of the Minerals Act. In terms of item 12(1) of the transitional arrangements, 
any person who can prove that his or her property has been expropriated in terms of 
any provision of Act 28 of 2002 may claim compensation from the state. Act 28 of 
2002 also makes provision for the granting of (new) prospecting rights by the state 
in terms of the provisions of the act (s 17). (For a brief discussion of the conversion 
of “old order prospecting rights” into new prospecting rights and the de novo ap-
plication for prospecting rights see Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s Law of Property (2006) 677-681 and 707-708 respectively.)
A distinction should be drawn between compliance with the requirements for an 
application for a prospecting right and the requirements for granting a prospecting 
right. An application for a (new) prospecting right has to be submitted to the office 
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of the regional manager in whose region the land is situated (s 16(1)(a)). If the pre-
scribed requirements are met, the regional manager must accept an application for 
a prospecting right (see s 16(2)). After acceptance of the application, consultation 
with interested or affected parties must take place (see further s 10(1)). Objections to 
the granting of a prospecting right can also be raised with the regional manager for 
consideration and advice by the Regional Mining Development and Environmental 
Committee (see s 10(2)). Upon compliance with other requirements, such as receipt 
of an environmental management plan and results of consultations with the owner 
or lawful occupier of land or other affected parties (see s 16(4) and (5)), the regional 
manager must forward the application to the minister (or her delegate) for considera-
tion (s 16(5)). Upon compliance with the specified requirements (see s 17(1) and (2)), 
which also include submitting a prospecting work programme, the minister (or her 
delegate) must grant a prospecting right (s 17(1)).
In terms of section 103(1) of Act 28 of 2002 the minister has by virtue of a delega-
tion on 12 May 2004 inter alia delegated the power to grant or refuse a prospecting 
right to the deputy director-general: mineral development. The further delegation 
of powers by the delegate was prohibited by the minister in terms of section 103(2) 
of Act 28 of 2002. (As to the ministerial delegation in general (and the delegation 
by the director-general on 7 July 2004 in terms of s 103(3) of the act), see further 
Carnelley in Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 
(2004 revision service 3) 2-9 to 2-13. As to the legal problems and uncertainty cre-
ated by the ministerial delegation (and delegation by the director-general) of powers 
without assignment of duties, see the detailed discussion of Dale et al South African 
Mineral and Petroleum Law (2005) MPRDA-600 to MPRDA-613.) Since the min-
isterial delegation, acceptance of an application for a prospecting right must still 
take place by the regional manager, whilst the deputy director-general has to grant 
or refuse a prospecting right.
A prospecting right granted is said to become effective on the date of approval 
of an environmental management plan (s 17(5); the reference to an “environmental 
management programme” in s 17(5) is clearly a mistake by the legislature). A pros-
pecting right may only be amended or varied by written ministerial consent (s 102; 
the power to amend a prospecting right has not been delegated by the ministerial 
delegation of 12 May 2004).
In terms of section 5(4) of the act prospecting may, however, not take place with-
out (a) a prospecting right; (b) an approved environmental management plan; and 
(c) notification of and consultation with the owner or lawful occupier of the land. 
If a holder of a prospecting right is prevented from commencing or conducting any 
prospecting operations because the owner or the lawful occupier of the land inter 
alia refuses to allow such holder to enter the land, provision is made for the regional 
manager to request the parties to reach an agreement for the payment of compensa-
tion for loss or damage as a result of prospecting (see s 54(1)-(3)). Upon failure to 
reach such an agreement, compensation must be determined by arbitration or by a 
competent court (s 54(4)).
3 Facts
This was not the first duel between the respondents and Meepo (see Badenhorst 
“Vereistes vir ’n tydelike permit om prospekteerwerksaamhede voort te sit” 2002 
Obiter 186). For the purposes of this discussion, the following facts of the case are 
relevant: Kotze, the first respondent, was the owner of a farm (the remainder of the 
farm Lanyon Vale 376) (108A-109A). On 1 July 2001 Kotze applied for a prospect-
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ing permit in terms of section 6 of the Minerals Act 50 of 1991 to prospect for min-
erals on the farm. Bathopele Mining Investments (Pty) Ltd, the second respondent, 
was subsequently joined as a co-applicant for purposes of the application (109E-F) 
(insofar as the court accepted that there was no difference for the purpose of the pro-
ceedings between their interests, the court’s reference to them as the “respondents” 
(109B), will also be followed in this case discussion). Despite a number of enquiries 
on their behalf, the respondents were never informed of the fate of their application 
before the repeal of the Minerals Act and the commencement of Act 28 of 2002 on 1 
May 2004. The applicant also applied for a prospecting permit for diamonds on the 
farm in terms of the Minerals Act (109F).
Upon commencement of Act 28 of 2002, Meepo applied for a prospecting right 
to prospect for diamonds on the farm (109G). The deputy director-general of the 
department of minerals and energy accepted the application on 6 January 2005 (the 
court actually referred to “approval”, which may be misleading). The document, as 
well as a power of attorney, was signed by the deputy director-general. The deputy 
director-general purported in the power of attorney to have delegated his power to 
sign the prospecting right in favour of Meepo to the regional manager (123B). A 
prospecting right (the “first prospecting right”) in terms of section 17 of Act 28 of 
2002 was issued to Meepo. The prospecting right was signed on 24 March 2005 by 
the regional manager “for and on behalf of the minister”. Due to technical problems 
the registration of the prospecting right did not take place in the Mineral and Pe-
troleum Titles Office (124C). The respondents objected in writing on 15 June 2005 
(the decision actually refers to 2004) to the regional manager against the granting of 
the first prospecting right to Meepo. The objection was not upheld. On 5 April 2005 
the respondents appealed in terms of section 96 of the act to the director-general 
against the granting of the first prospecting right (110D). On 1 July 2005 the regional 
manager and Meepo notarially executed a second document in terms of which a 
prospecting right (the “second prospecting right”) was granted to Meepo in terms 
of section 17 of the act. According to the introduction of the document of the second 
prospecting right, this right replaced the first prospecting right. This document was 
also signed by the regional manager “on behalf of the minister”. Unlike the first 
prospecting right, the second prospecting right was duly registered in the Mineral 
and Petroleum Titles Office on 18 July 2005 (109I; see also 124G). On 20 July the 
regional manager approved Meepo’s environmental management plan whereby the 
second prospecting right became effective in terms of section 17(5) of the act (110B). 
No appeal was filed against the granting of the second prospecting right, because 
the respondents only became aware of the second prospecting right when the main 
application (see below) was served. The appeal was still pending when the counter-
application (see below) was lodged (110E).
On several occasions since the end of July 2005, armed with its prospecting 
right to prospect for diamonds on the farm, Meepo approached Kotze for access 
to the farm for purposes of exercising its rights to prospect for diamonds on the 
farm. Kotze, however, refused Meepo access to the farm, contending inter alia that 
Meepo’s prospecting right was “void ab initio” (108C). Meepo applied to court for 
a declaration that it is by virtue of the second prospecting right (109I) entitled to 
access to the farm, to commence and carry on with prospecting operations and that 
Kotze be ordered to allow Meepo to have such access and to commence and carry 
on with prospecting operations on the farm (108C). In a counter-application lodged 
on 2 August 2006 the respondents inter alia applied for the review and setting aside 
of the prospecting right issued to Meepo (108F).
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4 General remarks about Act 28 of 2002
4.1 At the outset the court made some general remarks about the act which are 
welcomed at this stage in the absence of reported decisions on provisions of the 
act. The court’s reference to sections of the act and the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa of 1996 are retained in brackets. The general remarks of the court 
are followed by some brief comments. According to the court the act introduced a 
number of fundamental changes to the statutory regulation of the mineral resources 
of the Republic of South Africa:
(a)  The following fundamental changes were said to be apposite to the proceed-
ings:
 (i)   the legislature has done away with the traditional concept of “mineral 
rights”. The state is now the custodian of the mineral and petroleum re-
sources of the Republic of South Africa (s 3);
 (iii)   no provision is made for the compulsory compensation of an owner of 
land for the surface of its land for the purposes of prospecting or mining 
for minerals except in cases of expropriation (sch 2 item 12) or by means 
of arbitration (s 54);
 (iii)   the holder of a prospecting or a mining right now has a limited real right 
in the land which is the subject matter of the right, and this right must be 
registered (s 5(1) and 19(2)(a));
 (iv)   the prevalence of state power of control over the mineral resources of the 
Republic and the concomitant ousting of the mineral rights of the owner 
of the land or holder of a mineral right (s 3(2)) (110G).
(b) A consideration of the provisions of the act inevitably leads to a realisation of 
the conflict between the interests and/or rights of a holder of a prospecting or 
mining right and the owner of land. All these rights are core rights enshrined 
in the bill of rights (see s 24 and 25 of the constitution) (111A).
(c)  Upon interpretation of the applicable provisions of the act that may be suspect 
of more than one construction, preference should be given to that construc-
tion which would result in the most rational balance between the aforesaid 
conflicting interests and/or rights of a holder of a prospecting right or mining 
right on the one hand and the owner of the land on the other hand (111C).
4.2 The court does not in (a)(i) and (iv) of 4.1 above clearly distinguish between 
the subsections of section 3. Section 3(1) determines that “[m]ineral and petroleum 
resources are the common heritage of all the people of South Africa and the state 
is the custodian thereof for the benefit of all South Africans”, whilst section 3(2) 
empowers the state, acting through the minister, as custodian of the nation’s min-
eral and petroleum resources to grant various rights to minerals and petroleum. The 
court seemed to have accepted that section 3 has resulted in the state being custo-
dian of the mineral and petroleum resources and in the ousting of the traditional 
mineral rights because of the state’s power of control over mineral and petroleum 
resources. Suffice it to state that the views as to the meaning of sections 3(1) and (2) 
differ (see the views of Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law 13-3 
to 13-6, Dale et al MPRDA-120 to MPRDA-131, Glazewski Environmental Law in 
South Africa (2005) 464 468, Van der Schyff The Constitutionality of the Mineral 
and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (2006 thesis North West 
University) 149-152). The different views are discussed by Badenhorst and Mostert 
(“Artikel 3(1) en (2) van die Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
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28 van 2002: ’n herbeskouing” 2007 TSAR 469 and Badenhorst “Mineral rights are 
dead! Long live mineral rights!” 2008 TSAR 156).
It is correct that provision is not expressly made for the compulsory compensa-
tion of an owner of land for the surface of its land for the purposes of prospecting 
or mining for minerals. It seems as if the court suggested that item 12 of the tran-
sitional arrangements is not limited to the possible expropriations in terms of the 
transitional measures. Indeed item 12(1) is cast in very wide terms: “Any person 
who can prove that his or her property has been expropriated in terms of any provi-
sion of this Act may claim compensation from the State” (our italics). On the other 
hand, item 12 forms part of the transitional arrangements of the act. According to 
the wide interpretation of item 12, an owner of land whose surface use of the land 
is lost as a result of the granting of a prospecting right may claim compensation for 
expropriation. Dale et al (MPRDA-129) also mention this possibility. This would 
have far-reaching consequences insofar as every owner of land whose use of land is 
lost as a result of the granting of a prospecting right, mining right or other rights to 
minerals would have a claim against the state on the basis of expropriation. These 
expropriation claims could run into millions of rands (see eg Ryan “Ball rolling on 
2.7bn mine suit” Fin24 09-01-2008, http://www.fin24.co.za). It should, however, be 
noted that the minister is expressly empowered by section 55(1) of the act to expro-
priate property for purposes of prospecting or mining if it is necessary to achieve 
the objectives of the act. This would be a formal expropriation incorporating pro-
visions of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 (s 55(2) of Act 28 of 2002). Section 54 
also makes provision for compensation under certain circumstances by agreement 
between the owner of the land and holders of prospecting or mining rights, arbitra-
tion or decision by a court, in the absence of such agreement. This compensation 
would, however, not be paid by the state but by the holder of the prospecting right 
or mining right. Item 12(1) is not stated to be subject to the provisions of either sec-
tion 54 or 55 of the act. It seems that if an owner or lawful occupier of land does not 
prevent the holder of a prospecting right or mining right to commence or continue 
with prospecting or mining operations, compensation for loss of the use of land by 
expropriation on the granting of prospecting or mining rights against the state could 
be claimed. If the owner or lawful occupier prevents the prospector or miner from 
commencing or continuing with prospecting or mining operations, section 54 comes 
into play. It is beyond the ambit of the current discussion to consider whether such 
an outcome was indeed envisaged by the legislature, even if it could be regarded as 
fair from the perspective of the owner or occupier of land.
It is correct that a prospecting right or mining right granted by the state is labelled 
as a limited real right in section 5(1) of the act and that these rights have to be regis-
tered in the Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration Office. The director-general 
is empowered in terms of section 5(1)(d) of the Mining Titles Registration Act 16 of 
1967 to register such rights. In addition, section 2(4) of the Mining Titles Registra-
tion Act states that the registration of a right in the Mineral and Petroleum Titles 
Registration Office shall constitute a limited real right binding on third parties. It 
was submitted earlier that in terms of property theory the grant of a prospecting or 
mining right by the state only creates personal rights, whereas a limited real right is 
created upon registration of a prospecting right or mining right in the Mineral and 
Petroleum Titles Office (see Badenhorst “Nature of new order rights to minerals: a 
Rubikian exercise since passing the mayday Rubicon with a cubic circonium” 2005 
Obiter 505). As will be seen below, the court in the present case held that the grant-
ing of a prospecting right is based upon an agreement between the state and the 
applicant. In the proposed amendment of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources De-
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velopment Act (B10-2007), section 5(1) will read that a prospecting right or mining 
right granted in terms of the act and registered in terms of the Mining Titles Reg-
istration Act is a limited real right. The additional requirement in the subsection of 
registration of the right is in line with property law doctrine and to be welcomed.
It is correct that conflicting prospecting rights, mining rights and ownership of 
land are “property” for purposes of section 25 of the constitution (see in general 
Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law 25-22 to 25-22B). It is also 
correct that resolving conflicting interests between prospecting rights or mining 
rights and ownership also involves environmental rights in terms of section 24 of 
the constitution. The court seemed to have suggested that in conflicts between own-
ers of land and holders of prospecting rights or mining rights the property clause 
comes into play. It is, however, interesting to take note of the recent decision in 
Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd (2007 2 SA 363 (SCA)). The 
supreme court of appeal regarded it unnecessary to deal with the court a quo’s find-
ing that an implied term to conduct open-cast mining would be in conflict with the 
guarantee against arbitrary deprivation of property afforded by section 25 of the 
constitution (see 374I/J-375A; as to a discussion and criticism of the court a quo’s 
finding on the constitutional principles, see Badenhorst and Mostert 2007 TSAR 
419-421). The court, nevertheless, expressed its opinion that the notion of arbitrary 
deprivation does not enter the picture at all (375D). The need found by the court a 
quo to apply section 39(2) of the constitution was also rejected by the supreme court 
of appeal. According to the court, resolution of conflicting interests in the case of 
servitudes and mineral rights does not require that one of these conflicting interests 
be preferred by any of the values underlying the bill of rights. Application of section 
39(2) of the constitution would according to the court not have yielded a different 
answer from the common law (375E-F). Conflicts between the owner of the land and 
the holder of a mineral right should, thus, according to the supreme court of appeal 
be resolved in accordance with servitutal principles designed to resolve conflicts 
between owners and holders of servitudes. The same approach would probably be 
followed by the supreme court of appeal in resolving conflicts between owners of 
land and holders of (new) rights to minerals.
The interpretation of the provisions of Act 28 of 2002 proposed and followed by 
the court in the present case is principally sound, but does not take into account 
the manner of interpretation prescribed in section 4 of the act. Briefly, a reasonable 
interpretation consistent with the objectives of the act (as stated in section 2) is pre-
ferred and the act prevails over inconsistent common law. (See further Badenhorst 
and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law 13-2 to 13-3; Dale et al MPRDA-132 to 
MPRDA-133.) These prescribed forms of interpretation should have been used and 
should have preceded the court’s proposed mode of interpretation. It is conceded 
that section 2(h) does make provision for giving effect to section 24 of the constitu-
tion by describing the manner of development of mineral resources.
5 Decision
For ease of discussion, the chronological order of the decision is altered somewhat 
in the following analysis. The court decided as follows:
5.1 Application for prospecting permit under the Minerals Act
At issue was whether the application for a prospecting permit by the respondents 
was still a pending application on 1 May 2004 (130G). The court accepted as com-
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mon cause that the respondents applied for a prospecting permit in terms of the 
Minerals Act (130C). On the evidence it was accepted that no decision was taken 
during February 2004 to refuse the application for a permit (132H-J; see further 
130H-133G). It was also accepted that at the commencement of the act on 1 May 
2004 the defendants had not been informed by the department of the fate of this 
application (130C). In the absence of any other evidence, the court accepted that the 
application for the prospecting permit was still pending when Meepo submitted its 
application for a prospecting right under the act to the regional manager (134B).
The court held that the application for a prospecting permit should have been 
processed as a pending application under item 3 of the second schedule of the act. 
The court ordered that the regional manager and minister be directed to process 
the application of the respondents for a prospecting permit as a pending application 
under item 3 of schedule II of the act (134I). This would entail that the application 
for a prospecting permit must be regarded as having been lodged in terms of section 
16 of the act (item 3(1) does, however, not refer to section 16 and is clearly another 
mistake by the legislature). If such application does not meet the requirements for 
a prospecting right the regional manager will have to direct the applicant to submit 
the outstanding information within 120 days (item 3(2)).
5.2 Prospecting rights in terms of Act 28 of 2002
5.2.1 Main application: exercising of the prospecting right
The court did not agree with the view that a prospecting right only becomes effec-
tive in terms of section 17(5) of the act on the date of approval of the environmental 
management plan. The court correctly explained that the holder of a prospecting 
right acquires rights as such upon the granting of the right, for instance the right to 
have his environmental management plan considered and/or approved in terms of 
section 39 of the act. What is postponed by section 17(5) is the exercising of the right 
to prospect and to remove minerals (with reference to s 5(4)), but the rights become 
vested in the holder upon the granting of that prospecting right (125H).
It was argued that Meepo was not entitled to access to the farm and to prospect 
for diamonds by reason of its failure to consult with the owner of the land (Kotze) 
after it was granted a prospecting right and before demanding access to the farm as 
required by section 5(4) of the act. It was further argued that Meepo’s application 
was prematurely brought (111E).
At issue was whether section 5(4) of the act (ie notification and consultation with 
the owner or lawful occupier of the land prior to exercise of the prospecting right) 
“refers to a consultation process pre or post the granting of a prospecting right” 
(111H). The court held that by enactment of section 5(4)(c) of the act the legislature 
intended that, after the granting of a prospecting right and before the commencement 
of prospecting activities on land subject to a prospecting right, proper notice of the 
intention to enter the land for purposes of prospecting should be given to the owner 
of land, followed by a consultative process (116H). Access for prospecting is not 
authorised without prior consultation with the owner of the land (117I). The court 
accordingly found that the main application by Meepo was, therefore, prematurely 
brought and could not succeed (117I-J).
The court found it unnecessary to deal with the issue whether a proper consulta-
tion was held with Kotze as owner of the land in terms of section 16 of the act. In 
terms of section 16(4) it is required of an applicant of a prospecting right to notify 
in writing and consult with the owner of the land. This consultation should not be 
confused with the consultation with the owner of land in terms of section 5(4) prior 
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to the exercise of prospecting rights. The court accepted that Kotze was properly 
invited to attend such consultation in terms of section 16 and had sufficient op-
portunity to participate therein (117J–118A). The reasoning of the court was as fol-
lows: firstly, the court was of the view that the provisions of the act (especially the 
fundamental principles in chapter 2) should be interpreted with due regard to the 
constitutional rights, norms and values the legislature sought to encapsulate, protect 
and advance in the said act. The court’s reference to sections of the Act 28 of 2002 
and the constitution is retained in brackets. The more prominent rights, norms and 
values, according to the court appear to be:
(a)  the custodial role of the state over the mineral and petroleum resources of the 
nation and the concomitant disposal of the traditional concept of state and/or 
individual rights to unexploited minerals (s 3(1) of the act; s 3(2) should also 
have been cited);
(b)  the state’s duty to protect the environment for the benefit of present and future 
generations (s 24 of the constitution of 1996 and the preamble of the act);
(c)  the right to equitable access to natural resources of the country (s 25(4)(a) of 
the constitution); and
(d)  the right not to be deprived of property arbitrarily (s 25(1) of the constitution 
and s 2 of the act) (113H–114F) . It should be noted that only the objective to 
provide security of tenure in respect of prospecting and mining operations is 
listed in section 2(g). The question of security of tenure of rights to land does 
resort under the property clause.
The court was of the opinion that the legislature intended to provide in the act for 
a rational balance between inter alia the rights of the holder of a prospecting right 
and the “property rights” of the owner of land, as well as the fundamental right to 
have the environment protected. The provision of the act should accordingly be 
interpreted with due regard to the constitutional values and norms mentioned above 
(113H).
The court reasoned that since the granting of a prospecting right results in serious 
inroads in the property rights of the owner of land, the legislature has attempted to 
alleviate these consequences by providing for due consultation between the owner of 
land and the holder of a prospecting right. The court recognised the opportunity to 
object to an application by the applicant for a prospecting right to the regional man-
ager, consideration of the objection in terms of section 10(2) of the act and payment 
of compensation in terms of section 54 of the act. Apart from these opportunities the 
court correctly indicated that consultation is the only prescribed means whereby an 
owner of land is to be apprised of the impact that prospecting activities may have on 
his land (114D). The court concluded that for the aforegoing reasons “these sections of 
the MPRDA providing for consultations between an applicant for and/or a holder of a 
prospecting right and a landowner should be widely construed” (114F).
Secondly, with reference to the heading of section 5, the court was of the opinion 
that the legislature intended that the provisions of section 5 are applicable to holders 
of rights already granted under the act. The court correctly explained (with refer-
ence to the definition of “holder” in s 1 of the act) that a person can either be the 
holder of a right or a successor in title of a holder, subsequent to the granting of the 
right (114G). The wording of section 5(4) was held to be indicative thereof in that 
it refers to a holder of a right (114I). The court reasoned that the persons referred 
to in section 10(2) and 16(4)(b) of the act are not holders of a prospecting right but 
mere applicants for a prospecting right (114J). Applicants of prospecting rights are 
not entitled to the rights referred to in section 5 of the act, namely to enter land, 
TSAR 2008 . 4 [ISSN 0257 – 7747]
828 BADENHORST AND MOSTERT
prospect for minerals, remove minerals found during prospecting, use water on the 
land for prospecting and carry out incidental prospecting activities 114J). The court 
correctly concluded: “What a landowner needs to be notified of and consulted about 
is the intention of a holder [of a prospecting right] to commence with his or her pros-
pecting activities and any work incidental thereto” (115B).
Thirdly, the court mentioned that an application for a prospecting right must con-
tain a prospecting work programme. More detail with regard to the potential impact 
of the environment by prospecting has to be submitted and contained in an environ-
mental management plan. Upon approval of the environmental management plan 
the holder of a prospecting right is entitled to exercise his entitlements in terms of 
section 5(3). These activities may, according to the court, have a major disruptive 
effect on the owner or occupiers of the land. The court provided examples of such 
activities. The court opined that the consultative process envisaged in section 5(4)
(c) of the act is intended to afford an owner of land the opportunity of “softening the 
blow” inevitably suffered as a consequence of the granting of a prospecting right. 
Barring the other methods of dispute resolution mentioned by the court, section 5(4)
(c) provides the only means afforded in the act to an owner of land to protect his 
rights as such. This interpretation is justified by the court in the sense that it accords 
with the rational balancing of conflicting interests and/or rights (115C).
5.2.2 Preliminary issue with the counter-application
The legal question was whether, even if the counter-application has been lodged 
prematurely (in other words prior to the exhaustion of the respondents’ internal rem-
edies), it would have been a nullity which could not be entertained and adjudicated 
upon by the court (109D).
The court found that on 5 April 2005 the respondents lodged an appeal (presum-
ably in terms of section 96 of the act) against the granting of Meepo’s prospecting 
right. Despite numerous enquiries regarding the progress with the appeal it was 
not finalised after the date on which the counter-application had been lodged on 2 
August 2006 (118C). The court found further that the respondents’ internal appeal 
was finalised and dismissed during November/December 2006 and, therefore, well 
before the date on which hearing of this matter (including the counter-application) 
commenced (119G).
The court decided that the counter-application had not been lodged prematurely 
(119G). The court reasoned that even on the assumption that the mere lodging of 
the counter-application amounted to an application as contemplated in section 96(3) 
of the act, the fact remained that, by the time the relief applied for in the counter-
application was actually argued and considered, the appeal had been finalised and 
the internal remedies had, therefore, in esse been exhausted (119I). The court held 
that, at the date of the hearing, it was clear that the appeal had in fact in the mean-
time been turned down, and since all parties were thoroughly prepared to argue the 
counter-application, the point in limine should not have been persisted with (120E) 
and could not succeed (122F).
The court held that although the provisions of section 96(3) are on the face of it 
peremptory in nature, the fact that the internal remedies were exhausted by the time 
the matter was heard constituted substantial and sufficient compliance with those 
provisions (121B). The court reasoned that the intention of the legislature with sec-
tion 96 was obviously to ensure that internal remedies are exhausted before deci-
sions contemplated in section 96(3) are subject to the scrutiny of the courts and the 
cost of such course incurred (121J). It was regarded as inconceivable by the court 
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that it could be argued that for a court to consider the counter-application under 
these circumstances would frustrate the legislature’s objective with the provisions 
of section 96(3) (122A). The court explained that the provisions of section 96(3) 
were clearly intended to give the authorities the “procedural advantage” of not being 
liable to sanction by the courts before being afforded the opportunity of reconsider-
ing its own administrative actions (122D). According to the court it could also be 
argued that, in regulations promulgated in terms of the MPRDA, an obligation to 
give interested parties the opportunity to be heard in the consideration of such an 
internal appeal, the provisions of section 96(3) were also intended for the benefit of 
interested parties (122D).
5.2.3 Counter-application: validity of the prospecting right
At issue was when, and as a result of whose administrative conduct, the prospecting 
right as contemplated in the act was granted to Meepo (124F). The court held that 
the act in terms of which a prospecting right is granted to an applicant is contrac-
tual by nature. It entails that the minister, being the representative of the state as 
custodian of the mineral resources of the Republic of South Africa, consensually 
agrees to grant to an applicant a “limited real right” (sic) to prospect for a mineral 
or minerals on specified land for specified period and subject to such conditions as 
may be determined upon or agreed upon. The court then held that, until such terms 
and conditions had been determined and consensually agreed upon or consented 
to by an applicant, it cannot be said that a prospecting right had been granted to an 
applicant: “The right can only be granted once the terms and conditions had been 
determined and communicated to an applicant for his acceptance” (125F)
The court decided that it is the prerogative of the grantor of the right to determine 
the terms and conditions to which it would be subject. According to the court, the 
definitive issue is not the content of the terms or conditions of the right, but the au-
thority of the grantor to determine whatever terms and conditions he/she may wish 
(127I). The court found that the terms and conditions of Meepo’s prospecting right 
were not determined by the grantor of the right, namely the deputy director-general, 
but by the regional manager (126F-127G). The regional manager was held not to be 
authorised to determine the same (127H). The court found that in acting as such, the 
regional manager acted ultra vires his statutory powers (127I).
The court indicated that a prospecting right had been granted to Meepo, firstly, 
on 24 March 2005 and again on 1 July 2005 (125J). The court found that the second 
prospecting right held by Meepo was granted by the regional manager who was not 
authorised to grant the right on behalf or the minister or the deputy director-general 
(126C). Earlier the court accepted that it was common cause that: (a) the minister 
had properly delegated her power to grant a prospecting right to the deputy director-
general; (b) the deputy director-general had no such original or delegated power; 
and (c) any further delegation of its delegated powers by the deputy director-general 
had been expressly prohibited by the minister (123B; the courts reference in (b) to 
the regional manager should read the deputy director-general). The court found that 
the granting of the second prospecting right by the regional manager was ultra vires 
his authority, rendering the prospecting right void (126C). The court found that: (a) 
the power of attorney was not a valid delegation of power by the deputy director-
general to the regional manager; (b) the second prospecting right was granted to 
Meepo by the regional manager; (c) conduct by the regional manager was ultra vires 
his authority, rendering the prospecting right void (126C).
The court also indicated that the second prospecting right differed from the first 
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prospecting right in material respects (128E). The argument that the regional man-
ager merely rectified errors in the already existing prospecting right was rejected 
by the court. The court was of the view that the regional manager replaced it with 
another prospecting right and issued Meepo a fresh prospecting right (129C-G). The 
regional manager was found to have had no authority and power of attorney to act as 
aforesaid and his conduct was ultra vires his authority (129G).
Lastly, the court found that the replacement of the first prospecting right with 
the second prospecting right amounted to more than a correction of clerical errors. 
The court held that an amendment of the period of validity of a prospecting right 
constituted an amendment of a prospecting right for purposes of section 102 of the 
act which in any event required the consent of the minister or the deputy director-
general (129H). It should be noted that this power has not been delegated to the 
deputy director-general by the minister.
In the light of the above reasons the court concluded that the second prospecting 
right issued to Meepo was of no force and effect and it was accordingly set aside 
(130B). The court also found that the acceptance and processing of the application 
for a prospecting right in terms of the act in disregard to the respondent’s pending 
application for a prospecting permit in terms of the Minerals Act was irregular 
and ultra vires the powers of the regional manager and/or the deputy director-gen-
eral. The prospecting right of Meepo, therefore, had to be reviewed and set aside 
(134B). The court ordered that the two prospecting rights be declared null and void 
(134B-134H).
Nevertheless, the court did not order that the second prospecting right be can-
celled or deregistered in the Mineral and Petroleum Titles Office. Cancellation and/
or deregistration is affected by the fact that the right legally never existed. It was, 
after all, granted by an ultra vires act. Section 7(1) of the Mining Titles Registration 
Act 16 of 1967 in the past provided that no registered deed of grant, deed of transfer, 
certificate of title or cession of a mortgage bond could be cancelled by the director-
general except upon a court order. The Mining Titles Registration Amendment Act 
24 of 2003 amended section 7(1) by requiring that “a registered deed conveying title 
to any right may not be cancelled by the director-general except as provided for by 
law”. (By mistake, the heading of section 7 of the Mining Titles Registration Act 
– “Registered deeds not to be cancelled except upon an order of court” – has been 
retained.) It is submitted that a procedure should be in place to rectify erroneous 
registrations in the mining titles register, such as that at stake in the case under dis-
cussion. Whether the provision on cancellation of registered rights is the appropriate 
mechanism for such rectification is a matter open to speculation. Section 6(1)(b) of 
the amended Mining Titles Registration Act read with section 6(2) determines that 
the director-general may rectify errors in deeds, diagrams, plans or other documents 
on file in the Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration Office, unless it would have 
the effect of alienating a right. The procedure for cancellation pertains, however, 
expressly to deeds “conveying title to any right” (s 7(1)). Since no title can be con-
veyed when, as in the case under discussion, the right granted was void ab initio, the 
section 7(1) cancellation provision would not be appropriate. In the absence of any 
other legislative provision and/or regulation to the Mining Titles Registration Act to 
deal with the treatment of erroneous registrations, however, it is submitted that the 
procedure envisaged by section 7(1), read with regulation 73, should also be applica-
ble in cases such as the present. Ideally, the Mining Titles Registration Act needs to 
be revised to provide a procedure for the rectification of errors specifically.
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6 Discussion
6.1 The importance of this decision lies in the fact that it provides some interesting 
pointers regarding the provisions of Act 28 of 2002, and confirms the operation of 
the act on a general level (see the general remarks made by the court, discussed at 
4.2 above).
Firstly, the grant of a prospecting right to an applicant in terms of the act by a del-
egate of the minister is construed as a contract in terms of which a right to prospect 
is granted to a prospector subject to the terms and conditions determined and agreed 
upon by the parties. The right to prospect is only granted once the terms and condi-
tions of the agreement had been determined and communicated to the applicant for 
his acceptance. The terms and conditions of a prospecting right agreement have 
to be determined by the deputy director-general. Amendment of such prospecting 
right agreement requires the consent of the minister. Upon the grant of a prospect-
ing right the holder thereof acquires rights in terms of their agreement, including 
the right to prospect. The exercising of the right to prospect and remove minerals is, 
however, postponed until the approval of the environmental management plan and 
compliance with section 5(4)(c) of the act.
It can be argued that the granting of a right in terms of the act by the minister 
or delegate to a holder has to be seen as a consensual agreement (Badenhorst and 
Mostert 13-13 to 13-14 and 30-3 to 30-4). In Ondombo Beleggings (Edms) Bpk v 
Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs (1991 4 SA 718 (A)) the court held that a 
prospecting lease in terms of section 4 of the Precious Stones Act 73 of 1964 is a 
consensual agreement (see further Badenhorst and Van Heerden “A comparison 
between the nature of prospecting leases in terms of the Precious Stones Act 73 of 
1964 and prospecting permits in terms of the Minerals Act 50 of 1991” 1993 TSAR 
159). Eksteen JA explained as follows in the Ondombo case (724F-H):
“The fact that the Act expressly requires certain matters to be dealt with in the lease, and in some 
instances gives the Minister an overriding say in determining certain terms, does not, in my view, 
detract from the contractual nature of the lease. After all much the same circumstances pertain to 
numerous commercial agreements, more particularly when an individual contracts with a large cor-
poration and is presented with a printed form of agreement. The mere fact that the individual may 
not readily be able to procure the alteration of any of the terms does not detract from the fact that his 
acceptance of those terms would lead to a binding contract being concluded.”
According to Dale et al (MPRDA-134) prospecting rights or mining rights can be 
compared to prospecting leases or mineral leases (and claim licences) that were 
available in terms of the Mining Rights Act 20 of 1967 and the Precious Stones Act 
73 of 1964 and legislation prior thereto. These authors maintain that such agree-
ments are partly contractual and partly administrative in nature, but remain crea-
tures of statute (see Dale et al MPRDA-134).
It is submitted that reference to a right to prospect may have different meanings 
and may at times be confusing. It could refer to the agreement entered into between 
the applicant for a prospecting right and the state, a (personal) right to prospect by 
virtue of such agreement, a (real) right to prospect created upon registration in the 
Mineral and Petroleum Titles Office and the content of such personal right or real 
right, namely the entitlement to prospect. For purposes of clarity it is submitted 
that a distinction should be drawn between a prospecting right contract/prospecting 
contract and the right to prospect as a personal right acquired in terms of the con-
tract. Other personal rights are also acquired by virtue of the contract. The right to 
prospect has as its content the entitlement to prospect. The entitlement to prospect 
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can only be exercised upon compliance with the requirements of section 5(4)(c). 
Upon registration of a prospecting right agreement, the personal right to prospect 
is terminated and a real right to prospect is established. Such real right has as its 
content the entitlement to prospect.
Secondly, the court clearly distinguished between the giving of notice and con-
sultation by an applicant for a prospecting right to and with the owner of land, re-
spectively, in terms of section 16(4) of the act and proper notice and consultation by 
a holder of a prospecting right to and with the owner of land, respectively, in terms 
of section 5(4)(c) of the act before commencement of prospecting operations.
Thirdly, the court emphasised the rational balancing of different interests and 
rights in resolving the conflict between the owner of land and the prospector.
Fourthly, an old order prospecting right was protected by the court against the 
acceptance and processing of a prospecting right in terms of the act in disregard to 
the pending application for a prospecting permit in terms of the Minerals Act. It is 
clear that “old order rights” should receive precedence to new order rights during the 
respective transitional periods.
Lastly, a liberal interpretation is given to the duty of an applicant to exhaust inter-
nal remedies in terms of section 96 of the act by allowing recourse to the court if the 
internal appeal was finalised when the matter was to be heard by the court.
It must be noted with some concern that the following comedy of errors was made 
by the state, ie the custodian of the mineral resources of the country:
(a)  Despite numerous enquiries, the respondents received no information be-
tween 1 May 2001 and 1 May 2004 as to the outcome of their application for 
a prospecting permit in terms of the Minerals Act.
(b)  The acceptance and processing of an application for a prospecting right in 
terms of the act by the department was in total disregard of the respondent’s 
pending application for a prospecting permit in terms of the Minerals Act.
(c)  Meepo’s application for a prospecting right in terms of the act was accepted 
by the deputy director-general instead of the regional manager.
(d)  The regional manager should have referred the application to the deputy di-
rector-general for his consideration, approval or disapproval of the prospect-
ing right.
(e)  The regional manager was not empowered to determine the terms of Meepo’s 
prospecting right, which had to be determined by the deputy director-gen-
eral.
(f)  The regional manager was not empowered to grant a prospecting right at all.
(g)  The regional manager was not empowered to grant a prospecting right on 
behalf of the minister (in the absence of a ministerial delegation) or deputy 
director-general (who lacked original power to delegate delegated ministerial 
authority by virtue of a power of attorney to the regional manager, which pur-
ported delegation was expressly prohibited by the minister).
(h)  The regional manager was not empowered to replace the first prospecting 
right with a second prospecting right and amend the period of validity of the 
prospecting right, which amendment required the consent of the minister.
The impossible task with which the minister was saddled in terms of the act was 
totally impractical and required delegation of powers and assignment of duties to 
make implementation of the act possible. The mistakes made by officials in the 
present case may just be the tip of the iceberg of legal problems expected from 
the ministerial delegation (and delegation by the director-general). The delegating 
documents are poorly drafted and only delegate powers but do not assign duties. 
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These delegations were only published internally and not in the Government Ga-
zette. Publication in the Gazette is, however, not required in the act. A relatively 
simple application for a prospecting right should not be hampered by so many mis-
takes on the part of government officials. This may be a great concern to mining 
companies intending to invest millions of rands in South Africa. This concern goes 
beyond the general complaint that the administration of the new mineral law system 
is more cumbersome and time consuming than in the past. The government should 
revisit the delegations of power or rather amend the act by clearly designating the 
official in the act who is empowered to perform specific functions and is subject to 
specific duties.
It seems that in the duel between holders of old order rights and applicants for new 
order rights, the state acting as first second in the dispute between such holders may 
at times not be sufficient to ensure fairness. As illustrated in the present case, the 
courts may be approached to act as a second témoins for both the duellists in order 
to ensure fairness.
7 Conclusion
This decision provides important pointers as to the interpretation of the provisions 
of the Act 28 of 2002 and is welcomed. The outcome of the decision was correct. 
The decision illustrates how the conduct of the state as custodian of the mineral re-
sources of the country may become a cause for concern not only due to problems as-
sociated with the delegation of powers but also in its administration of applications 
in general. Whether this indeed constitutes a general pattern must be ascertained 
by government. The administration of the act in terms of the delegations of power 
by the minister (and director-general) should be revisited by the legislature. In the 
duel between old and new order rights, a second témoins, the judiciary, is needed 
to ensure a fair fight upon the narrow bridge of transition to the brave new order. 
Not only honour but legitimate interests of duellist are at stake. These duels may, 
however, be at a high cost to applicants for prospecting and mining rights and the 
economy. The question remains whether the country and its people can afford the 
processing of applications for rights to mineral resources in a non-custodial manner. 
In the light of the duties imposed on the state in terms of the constitution and the 
act, “uncustodial”, as an indigenous or newly created word, may sound even more 
descriptive of the state of affairs.
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